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1 Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the semantics and pragmatics of the discourse marker ata in Belizean 
Kriol, as seen in (1). I show that ata is an adversative discourse marker similar to the Spanish 
discourse marker si, as described in Schwenter (1999, 2002), and that the two share much in 
terms of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. This is interesting, as there seems to be no English 
counterpart to the Kriol ata or Spanish si. 
 
(1) A: Wai yu nak yu sista?2 
 B: Ata da shee nak me fos! [KID] 
 
 A: Why did you hit your sister? 
 B: (But) it was she who hit me first!3  
 
In terms of ata, I argue that it is used to convey an emphatic contrast with the immediately 
preceding discourse and that this contrast is a conventional implicature of the type described in 
Grice (1975). In addition, it is frequently used in conveying negative attitudes toward the 
preceding discourse. I argue that this is not a conventional aspect of ata’s meaning but that it is 
instead calculated in context via Gricean pragmatic reasoning as a conversational implicature. 
Finally, I suggest a diachronic origin for ata in the Kriol focus marker da. This present account 
of ata, then, covers significantly different ground than the account given in Salmon (to appear). 
 In the next section, which follows from Salmon (to appear), I provide a brief background 
on the Kriol language as well as a discussion of where and how the data used in this paper were 
collected. 
 
1.1 On Belizean Kriol 
                                                            
1 Many thanks to the audience at the University of Minnesota Institute of Linguistics where this paper was presented 
in January 2014. Thanks also to Eve Sweetser, Martina Faller, and Michael Ellsworth for very helpful comments in 
the question and answer session of the BLS presentation. 
2 The spelling system used in this paper was proposed for Kriol by members of the Belize Kriol Project in 2002. The 
orthography is completely phonetic, with each symbol representing only one sound. See Decker (2005) for 
discussion and history. Sometimes it is necessary to provide interlinear glosses for the Kriol examples, and in these 
cases I have done so. When the translation to Standard English is straightforward, though, I omit the glosses in the 
interest of brevity. 
3 Following Schwenter (1999) and the dilemma for glossing adversative discourse marker si in Spanish, which 
similarly has no direct English counterpart, I will leave ata unglossed in later examples. 
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Belizean Kriol is an English-based creole spoken in the Central American/Caribbean country of 
Belize. It is sometimes considered to be the language specific to the Creole people there—those 
of Afro-European descent—but this is not correct, as many Belizeans speak Kriol and do not 
consider themselves to be Creole, and the language has become something of an unofficial 
lingua franca across the country.4 Though the official language is English, most Belizeans of all 
races and ethnicities can speak Kriol with differing degrees of proficiency. There is also a strong 
movement underway by the Belize Kriol Project and National Kriol Council of Belize to 
promote the language and culture in the country.5 To this end, there is a dictionary of Kriol 
(Kriol-Inglish Dikshineri) which defines many Kriol words and gives a brief grammatical 
description. There have also been more in-depth descriptions of the grammar, in Young (1973), 
Greene (1999), and Decker (2005). There is also a limited literary tradition written in Kriol as 
well as a weekly newspaper column in The Reporter, of Belize City. 
  
1.2  Research Methods  
 
I consulted 20 speakers of Belizean Kriol, with half of the speakers residing in Belize City and 
half from Punta Gorda. The paper was a work in progress while I was in Belize, so the 
information I gathered from early consultants helped me to sharpen my questions to those I 
interviewed later. As such, I did not receive 20 grammaticality judgments on each piece of data. 
However, I did make sure to test each piece of data with several speakers, gathering at least 5-10 
judgments for each piece of data, and as many as 15 for others.  
The consultants were of both sexes, and various ages, with the youngest being 18 and the 
oldest consultants being three women between the ages of 70-80. I also consulted several men in 
their 30s and 40s. Some of the speakers were bilingual with English and Kriol, and some 
reported speaking only Kriol.  
The data I use in this paper are of several kinds: There is directly elicited data concerning 
specific questions about the lexical items bot and ata, as well as recordings of conversation and 
unplanned discourse that I made in Belize City and Punta Gorda in January 2013. I have also 
made use of the Kriol-Inglish Dikshineri, which is published in cooperation with the Belize Kriol 
Project and Belize’s Ministry of Education. Examples taken from this work are tagged 
throughout the paper as “KID”. In addition, I have modified several example sentences from 
KID from unrelated dictionary entries as a means of testing acceptability intuitions among 
speakers of Kriol.  
 
2 Bot and Ata: Empirical Descriptions 
 
                                                            
4 See Escure (1997: 28-39) for a sociohistorical outline of Belizean Kriol, and suggestions as to the putative origins 
of Kriol in contact between Africans, Europeans, and Miskito Indians in the 18th and 19th centuries.  
5 Much of the work of these two organizations can be seen at the following web site: <http://www.kriol.org.bz/>. 
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There has been little prior work on ata in the linguistics literature, with the exception of Salmon 
(to appear), which is the source of much of the empirical coverage provided in the present paper. 
We begin with a brief empirical look at bot, which is very close to English but, and which is the 
closest thing possible to an English translation of ata. 
  
2.1 Bot 
 
Bot, which is pronounced [bot], or sometimes [bɔt], is very similar to English ‘but’ in many of its 
syntactic and semantic properties. Like but, bot is polyfunctional, though the two are not 
identical, as I will show below.  
Consider (2), with bot in initial position of the second clause in each sentence. In both 
examples, bot translates transparently to English as standard usages of but.  Essentially, bot/but 
here conjoins two clauses and conveys that the second clause is somehow in contrast with the 
first clause. 
 
(2) Hihn  da-mi     wahn shaat man, bot  ih    mi      fat  ahn schrang tu. 
 he      was        a       short man  but   he   PAST  fat  and strong   too   
 ‘He was a short man, but he was fat and strong, too’. [KID] 
 
In addition to the conjunctive examples, we also find the exceptive, prepositional use of 
bot, which compares to the common usage and syntactic configuration of English but. The Kriol 
sentence in (3) is perfectly acceptable, as is its English translation. 
 
(3) Mi  ma        mi  wap      all a  wi bot mi lee breda. 
 my mother PST punish  all of us but my little brother 
 ‘My mother punished all of us but my little brother’. [KID] 
 
The corrective use of bot in (4) was also accepted by my Kriol consultants in the given context. 
 
(4) [Context: You ordered juice, and the waiter brought you Coca Cola by mistake.] 
Ah noh waahn Coke, bot joos. 
 I don’t want Coke, but juice’.  
 
Another similarity shared between but and bot is that both are awkward to contemporary 
speakers in adverbial uses. For example, in (5a) we see the adverbial use of bot to mean ‘only’. 
My consultants rejected this as extremely awkward, and suggested correcting it with oanli ‘only’ 
as in (5b). 
 
(5) a. #Georgiana da-mi bot ten yaaz oal. 
  ‘Georgiana was but ten years old’.  
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 b. Georgiana da-mi oanli ten yaaz oal. 
 
This is not surprising, however, as this is an archaic, idiomatic usage of but, which sounds 
awkward to the native American English speakers that I polled as well, and Biber et al. (1999: 
81) note that this adverbial use of but is heavily restricted by context. 
More interesting for the purposes of this paper is the appearance of bot in sentence- and 
utterance-initial position, in which it relates the bot-sentence to some aspect of the preceding 
discourse. Consider (6), in which the speakers are reminiscing about their old neighborhood 
[from Greene (1999: 211)]. Here we see speaker B using bot to mark a contrast with something 
implied by speaker A’s statement. That is, speaker A describes how they used to be punished as 
children, and speaker B intends her statement to contrast with an inference of this: namely, that if 
one is punished then one will cease to get into trouble. 
 
(6) A:  Breda Luke yoostu liv deh tu bikaaz wen ih yoostu get chrobl dehn yoostu  
  put dehn finga pahn greta. 
 B: Bot dehn stil get chroble, speshali Pati. 
 
A: Brother Luke used to live there too, because when he used to get in  
 trouble, they used to smack their hands with a ruler. 
 B: But they still got into trouble, especially Patty. 
  
This sentence-initial, discourse marking bot in (6) compares directly to what we will see below 
with ata, which is required to be sentence-initial. Ata differs, though, in that it has a more 
specialized semantics than bot and that it occurs only in casual speech. Let’s take a closer look at 
ata now. 
 
2.2 Ata 
 
My Kriol consultants generally pronounce ata as ['ata], with primary stress on the initial syllable, 
and without aspiration on the medial but syllable-initial [t]. The initial vowel often seems to be 
lengthened as well, and there is generally no pause separating the discourse marker from the 
sentence that hosts it. In general, ata seems to be found only in spoken, unplanned speech (Ochs, 
1979). It is common to find examples of sentence-initial, discourse marking bot in written form, 
but I have been unable to find ata outside of casual speech. Several of my consultants remarked 
that they would only use ata in informal situations; otherwise, they would feel more comfortable 
using bot.  
The Kriol-Inglish Dikshineri (2007: 31) has a single entry for ata, which is given in full 
below in (7).  
 
 (7) ata  conj. but. (Generally denotes bad attitude.) 
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As I will show below, ata is much more restricted syntactically and pragmatically than bot is. 
Bot can replace ata in all cases, but ata cannot replace bot in all cases. Also, I will show that use 
of ata doesn’t necessarily require a bad attitude, as the entry quoted in (7) suggests. Rather, 
speakers use it to mark an emphatic contradiction with the immediately preceding discourse. As 
a result, it is not surprising that ata would seem to denote a bad attitude, as in moments of 
emphatic contrast speakers are often negative or confrontational. I will argue below, however, 
that this emotive message is not conventionally encoded but is instead derived pragmatically, 
resulting in a relatively minimal semantics for ata. 
Another important fact about ata is that it appears only in sentence-initial syntactic 
position. In my conversations and recorded data with consultants, all of the tokens of ata that I 
have are in sentence-initial position, used in an immediate response to a previous speaker. For 
example, consider (1) again from above, in which ata is sentence-initial in B’s response to A, 
and in which ata is used to contradict a contextual inference generated by A’s question: B takes 
A to imply that she is somehow unjustified in hitting her sister. 
 
(1) A: Wai yu nak yu sista? 
 B: Ata da shee nak me fos!  
 
 A: Why did you hit your sister? 
 B: ATA it was she who hit me first!  
 
Similarly, in (8), which is part of my recorded data, ata appears in initial position. Here, two men 
were talking about their plans to have met on the previous day at a gas station in Punta Gorda. 
There was some miscommunication, however, and the two failed to connect. 
 
(8) A: Yu da rong gyas stayshan!  
B: Ata no da-mi rong stayshan yesideh! 
 
 A:  You (were) at the wrong gas station! 
 B: ATA (I) was not (at) the wrong station yesterday! 
 
A similar use occurred later in this same conversation, when another man walked up and joined 
the men already there. One man asked the newcomer what he had done on the previous day. The 
newcomer responded that he was at home, but this didn’t match with what the first speaker 
believed, so he objected to the newcomer’s claim, using ata, and so marking a contrast with the 
newcomer’s assertion and with what he had believed about the newcomer previously. 
 
(9) A: Wat yu deh gwaahn yestudeh, mayn? 
B: Yestudeh da-mi hoahn. 
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A: Ata ai si yu yestudeh! Ai si yu yestudeh bai Braddick! Rait? 
 
A: What did you do yesterday, man? 
B: Yesterday I was at home. 
A: ATA I saw you yesterday! I saw you yesterday by Braddick’s! Right? 
 
The tokens in (8) and (9) were taken from recorded, unplanned speech, and are sentence-initial.  
In addition to this recorded data, I also tested my consultants directly with respect to the 
possibility of ata in sentence-internal positions that I constructed. To do so, I took grammatical 
bot-sentences from KID, and replaced bot with ata, as in (10) and (11).  
 
(10) #Hihn  da-mi      wahn shaat man, ata  ih    mi     fat  ahn schrang tu. 
   he      was        a        short man  but   he   PAST  fat  and strong   too   
 ‘He was a short man, ATA he was fat and strong, too’. [KID]  
 
(11) #Yu  di                play      bembeh ata Ah noh frayd fi yoo 
 you PRES.PROG pretend tough     but  I    not   afraid of you.EMPH 
‘You’re pretending to be tough, ATA I’m not afraid of you’. [KID] 
 
For each of these sentences, I asked my Punta Gorda consultants if the sentence would be 
acceptable. The response was negative. 
 I also tested adapted sentences using ata in place of exceptive and corrective bot, as in  
(12) and (13), and these were judged to be unacceptable. 
 
(12) #Mi ma       mi  wap      all a  wi ata mi lee breda. 
 my mother PST punish  all of us but my little brother 
 ‘My mother punished all of us ATA my little brother’.  
 
(13) [Context: You ordered juice, and the waiter brought you Coca Cola by mistake.] 
#Ah noh waahn Coke, ata joos. 
 I don’t want Coke, ATA juice’.  
 
Similarly, I tested ata in a sentence where it should mean ‘only’, akin to (5) above. This was also 
found to be unacceptable, as in (14). 
 
(14) a. #Georgiana da-mi ata ten yaaz oal. 
  ‘Georgiana was ATA ten years old’.  
 b. Georgiana da-mi oanli ten yaaz oal. 
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In all of the sentences tested above, ata falls in sentence-internal position and is found to be 
unacceptable.  
I also tested ata in clause-initial position, but immediately following a vocative address, 
as in (15). This too was not accepted.6  
 
(15) A: Ai mi tink yoo bai di groasriz! 
B: #Luis, ata Ai bai di rom! 
 
A: I thought you bought the groceries! 
B: Luis, ATA I bought the rum! 
 
It seems clear that ata strongly resists appearing in sentence-internal positions—even if those 
positions are clause-initial within the sentence. In this way, ata differs significantly from bot.  
 Ata also differs from bot in that its semantics encode an emphatic contrast to the immediately 
preceding discourse and that it must appear in a dialogic or multi-speaker situation. Bot encodes 
contrast, but it clearly lacks the additional requirements of ata, as bot can be perfectly felicitous 
in sentence-internal, monologual speech. Thus, part of what ata encodes conventionally is 
information about the kinds of contexts in which it appears.  
 A very clear comparison here can be seen with the constructions Fillmore, Kay, and 
O’Connor (1988: 506) argue to have “pragmatic point”. Fillmore et al. describe pragmatic point 
as follows: 
 
We find that in many cases idiomatic expressions have special pragmatic 
purposes associated with them. A large number of substantive idioms have 
obvious associated pragmatic practices (e.g. Good morning, How do you do?, 
once upon a time) […]. Him be a doctor?  
 
The final construction mentioned here by Fillmore et al. is referred to as a Mad Magazine 
Sentence (MMS) in Akmajian (1984) and Lambrecht (1990, 1994). Like ata, it encodes 
information about the kind of pragmatic situation in which it must occur. The MMS must be 
uttered as a response to a dubious assertion or presupposition, and it generally requires a rising 
intonation. In other words, a second speaker has to have said something about “him” becoming a 
doctor, and this proposition has to be considered dubious or unlikely by the person who 
responds, as in (16B). 
 
(16) A: I think John will be a great doctor someday. 
 B: Him be a doctor?! 
 
                                                            
6 This exchange was accepted only when there was a lengthy pause inserted between Luis and ata. This has the 
effect though of fully separating the vocative and ata, resulting in a sentence in which ata is still sentence-initial. 
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B cannot simply use the construction out of the blue—she must be responding to the speech of a  
second person. This situational dependency and specific pragmatic purpose are what Fillmore et 
al. are concerned with when they discuss a construction as having pragmatic point, and this is 
very similar to what we see with ata, which must be used to respond to and contradict some 
aspect of the immediately preceding discourse. Like the MMS, ata has a Hey, wait a minute! feel 
to it.  Both constructions are dialogic and must appear in a dialogue or multiparty exchange. This 
is also consistent with Fraser’s (2006: 197) description of various other discourse markers that 
require at least two speakers for felicitous use. Consider (17), which is Fraser’s (26a), and in 
which use of on the contrary as a DM seems to require at least two speakers, with speaker B 
responding to speaker A.  
 
(17) a. Fred is a nice guy. *On the contrary, he is a boor. 
b. A:  Fred is a nice guy. 
 B:  On the contrary, he is a boor. 
 
We can see then that on the contrary, the MMS, and ata are strongly interactional in that they are 
all used to respond to context and at the same time to create context. I am claiming especially for 
ata that this translates to a licensing requirement that is conventionally associated with the word 
itself.  
 
2.3 The Meaning of Ata 
 
As we have seen thus far, ata marks an emphatic contrast with some aspect of preceding 
discourse. I will argue that this content is conventional, semantic meaning, but that it is non-truth 
conditional meaning, and as such, that this contrast meaning should be analyzed as a Gricean 
(1975) conventional implicature in much the same way that the contrastive element of but is 
often described.7 
  There have been many, many accounts given over the years of the meaning of but, which 
differ in everything from theoretical framework to empirical claims about what but means in the 
first place. As such, I cannot review all of them here.8 For the purposes of this essay, I am 
                                                            
7 In this paper I am concerned only with Grice’s original conception of conventional implicature. Since Grice’s 
description of this class of meaning, it has been given at least two reinterpretations, for example, in Karttunen and 
Peters (1979), and more recently in Potts (2005). These reinterpretations fundamentally alter Grice’s category, and 
generally make different empirical predictions than does Grice’s original description. For example, Potts (2005) 
does not consider Grice’s data such as but as a conventional implicature device at all. See Salmon (2011) and Horn 
(2013) for arguments against Potts’s (2005) system and in favor of Grice’s original arrangement of the category, 
especially for the kinds of data with which Grice was originally concerned. 
8 See, for instance, Biber et al. (1999), Huddleston and Pullum (2003), Hall (2004), and the many sources therein. 
Toosarvandani (to appear) provides a very clear and recent discussion of the semantics of the counterexpectational, 
corrective and opposition uses of but as well as a landscape of prior semantic and pragmatic accounts of the 
conjunction. 
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assuming a roughly Gricean understanding of but, which is common in the semantics and 
pragmatics literature.9   
Grice (1975: 25-26) argued that but shares the same truth conditions as and, which is 
essentially that of logical conjunction. In addition, but also conveys a conventional implicature 
(CI) of contrast, which is conventional, semantic meaning, but which does not affect the truth 
conditions of a proposition containing but.10 Essentially, (18a) has the same truth conditions as 
(18b) and (18c). However, (18a) and (18b) differ in that (18a) conveys the CI given in (18d) in 
addition to the logical conjunction of (18c). The meaning in (18d) is conventional, semantic 
meaning, but it does not affect the truth conditions of (18a).  
 
(18) a. He is poor, but he is honest. 
b. He is poor, and he is honest. 
 c. [he is poor] & [he is honest] 
d. CI: There is some contrast between being poor and honest. 
 
Thus, but has a multidimensional semantic meaning, with one dimension being truth conditional 
and the other being a non-truth conditional statement of contrast.  
The contrastive component of ata’s meaning is similar. Ata is used to signal a contrast 
with some aspect of preceding discourse, but it does not change the truth conditions of its host 
sentence. Thus the contrast is part of ata’s semantic, lexical meaning, but it is non-truth 
conditional. This was tested with a written questionnaire with my Belizean consultants, described 
below in discussion of examples (19)-(20).  
I addressed the question of ata’s truth conditions by arranging sets of test sentences such 
as (19a-c) below, which consist of an ata sentence, its bot counterpart, and then a third sentence 
with no discourse marker. I included all three sentences on a sheet of paper, and then asked my 
consultants if they could think of a scenario in which (19a) would be true, but (19b) or (19c) 
would be false. 
 
(19) a. Ata da shee nak me fos! 
 b. Bot da shee nak me fos! 
 c. Da shee nak me fos! 
                                                            
9 See reference works in the Gricean tradition such as Levinson (1983: 128), Horn (2004: 4) and Huang (2007: 54) 
for verification of this. There are dissenters, though, such as Bach (1999), who is strongly Gricean, but who believes 
that conventional implicatures do not exist and are an unnecessary complication of Grice’s framework. Similarly, in 
the semantic-pragmatic framework of relevance theory, conventional implicature, as Carston (2004: 633) writes, 
“simply does not arise”. In relevance theory, conventional implicature devices are generally analyzed as “encoding 
procedural constraints on the inferential processes involved in deriving conversational implicatures”. See also 
Blakemore (2002: 45-48) and Carston (2002: 108) for discussion of conventional implicature meaning from the 
perspective of relevance theory. 
10 See Levinson (1983: 128), Horn (2004: 4) and Huang (2007: 54) for succinct definitions of conventional 
implicature. Also, Horn (2013) provides an extended history of the concept, tracing it at least to Frege’s Der 
Gedanke ‘The Thought’ (1918). 
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  ‘(But) it was she who hit me first!’  
 
My consultants agreed that there was no difference in the kind of event described. All three of 
the sentences make a claim about who hit whom first. The ata sentence in (19a) was also 
commonly described as being more likely to occur in an argument, or in a situation in which the 
speaker feels as if she is being blamed unfairly, etc.  
Another set of sentences I used is seen in (20a-c). 
 
(20) a. Ata yu neva tel mi tek owt di chrash. 
b. Bot yu neva tel mi tek owt di chrash. 
c. Yu neva tel mi tek owt di chrash. 
 (But) you never told me to take out the trash’. 
 
My consultants agreed here too that the sentences in (21a-c) could all be used to describe the 
same event, similar to what we saw in (19). The ata-sentence here seemed to express surprise, as 
if someone had unfairly chastised the speaker for not taking out the trash.  
Example (21) works in a similar fashion. Speaker A accuses B of stealing something, and 
B retorts in anger and surprise in (21a) that it was actually speaker A who has stolen it.  
 
(21) A: Wai yu teef dat? 
 B: a. Ata yoo du it!11  
     b. Bot yoo du it! 
     c. Yoo du it! 
 
A: Why did you steal that? 
 B: (But) you did it! 
 
The central claims of these sentences do not change with the change in discourse marker, and 
this is a strong argument that ata does not make a truth conditional contribution.  
What ata does do, I am arguing, is signal an emphatic contrast with the preceding 
discourse, which is analyzable as a Gricean conventional implicature. Since the emphatic 
contrast is a conventional part of ata’s meaning, it should not be cancelable or defeated in 
contexts in which it is not supported. We can find evidence that this is so quite straightforwardly. 
Consider (22), in which a waitress brings a bottle of water for a customer. With the waitress’ 
sentence, she implies that the water is all that the customer will be drinking. The customer isn’t 
sure if he wants more than just water or not: he might want coffee too, but he isn’t sure yet. So, 
he can use bot to indicate a mild contrast with the conversational implicature conveyed by the 
                                                            
11 Kriol has emphatic forms for many of the personal pronouns, which differ from the unmarked default forms. For 
example, all of the left-side forms are reserved for emphatic use: yoo/yu ‘you’, Ai/Ah ‘I’, shee/ih ‘she’, mee/mi ‘me’, 
etc. These emphatic pronouns seem likely candidates for Gricean conventional implicature analyses as well. 
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waitress. However, in this neutral, non-emphatic context, it is very odd for him to respond to the 
waitress with ata. 
 
(22)  [Ordering in a restaurant.] 
Waiter: Yu aada waata, rait? 
[Customer thinks about it for a second, and then speaks slowly.] 
Customer: {#Ata/bot} maybi Ah waahn kaafi tu. 
 
Waiter:  You ordered water, right? 
Customer: But maybe I want coffee too. 
 
We see, then, that the context needs to support an emphatic contrast in order to license the use of 
ata. If it does not, then ata is infelicitous. This is consistent with my claim that ata encodes 
emphatic contrast. On the other hand, if emphatic contrast were not conventionally encoded, we 
would expect it to be rejected in contexts such as (22) which do not support it. 
 
What about the emotive “bad attitude” of ata as described in the dictionary entry above in 
(7)? We saw in the survey examples of (19)-(21) that ata does not alter the truth conditions of the 
sentence which hosts it. There, we were interested only in the contrastive component of ata; 
however, it follows from those examples that the emotive element—however we define it—does 
not affect truth conditions either. In terms of semantics and pragmatics, this means that we would 
need to analyze the emotive component of ata as either a conventional implicature or a 
pragmatically derived conversational implicature, depending on whether or not the emotive 
component can be shown to be a conventional, semantic aspect of ata’s meaning. 
 A quick way to show that the bad attitude is not part of ata’s meaning is to find an 
example in which the bad attitude is missing. I asked consultants directly if it was necessary to 
be angry or have a bad attitude in the use of ata, and they said that it was not necessary.  They 
said that it is common to use it in arguments, but that it wasn’t necessary to be upset or angry, 
and that it can be used any time the speaker is excited. Some consultants also mentioned that 
they would use it when they were excited in informal situations. So, based on my consultants’ 
intuitions, it seems that use of ata does not require a bad attitude.  
 Consider (9) again. I was present when this exchange occurred, and there was no 
suggestion of anger or bad attitude on the part of either speaker. Instead, speaker A was merely 
surprised at the information given by speaker B, which didn’t match what A had previously 
believed. The conversation continued after this to a mundane, non-emotive topic. 
 
(9) A: Wat yu deh gwaahn yestudeh, mayn? 
B: Yestudeh da-mi hoahn. 
A: Ata ai si yu yestudeh! Ai si yu yestudeh bai Braddick! Rait? 
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A: What did you do yesterday, man? 
B: Yesterday I was at home. 
A: ATA I saw you yesterday! I saw you yesterday by Braddick’s! Right? 
 
The absence of emotion or bad attitude in this exchange suggests that this is not a conventional 
component of ata’s meaning, and this matches precisely with my consultants’ own intuitions 
about how ata can be used.  
Accordingly, if the emotive component is not conventionally associated with ata, then it 
cannot be a conventional implicature, as this category of meaning is by definition non-
cancelable.12 The only remaining option is that it must be pragmatically derived in context or 
conveyed via paralinguistic signals above and beyond the linguistic content. The latter option—
paralinguistic signals such as body language, tone, etc.—are certainly significant, but they are 
beyond the scope of this paper. In addition to these, however, I believe that a kind of Gricean 
reasoning plays a role in the process above and beyond any paralinguistic signal. That is, if a 
speaker chooses to use the more restricted ata rather than a less restrictive alternative, such as 
bot, she then invites inferences that there is something marked about the situation, which could 
very well be interpreted as the speaker being upset or, in the words of KID, having “a bad 
attitude”.  
We can look to Horn’s (1984, 2004) Division of Pragmatic Labor as a means of 
understanding this inference process.13 Here is Horn (1984: 22) in a description of the process: 
The use of a marked (relatively complex and/or prolix) expression when a corresponding 
unmarked (simpler, less ‘effortful’) alternate expression is available tends to be interpreted as 
conveying a marked message (one which the unmarked alternative would not or could not have 
conveyed). Essentially, if a marked expression is used to describe a situation, it is likely that the 
speaker believes there is something marked or unusual about the situation itself. This invites 
addressees to infer or calculate conversational implicatures above and beyond the literal 
message. Horn (2004: 16) illustrates this process, as in (23): 
 
(23) a. He stopped the machine.  
b. He got the machine to stop. 
c. There is something unusual about the way he got the machine to stop. 
 
While (23a-b) seem to be truth-conditionally consistent, (23b), which is more marked and prolix, 
conveys a conversational implicature that there is something unusual in the way he got the 
machine to stop, as in (23c). 
                                                            
12 Horn (2004: 2) provides a succinct characterization of the Gricean conventional implicature: “Such detachable but 
non-cancelable aspects of meaning that are neither part of what is said nor calculable from what is said are 
conventional implicatures”. 
13 See McCawley (1978) for description of a similar reasoning process. See Levinson (1983: 117) and Grice (1989: 
31) on the role of calculability in conversational implicatures in general. 
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 Horn is concerned here primarily with markedness as a product of prolixity. However, 
markedness can be achieved many ways.14 We have seen thus far that ata is much more 
restricted syntactically, semantically, and pragmatically, than bot is. Thus, by its very nature it is 
a much more marked term, and as we have seen above, bot can appear in any of the ata 
examples, but the reverse is not true. Accordingly, a speaker’s use of the marked ata can invite 
the addressee to draw inferences with respect to a marked situation, including the speaker’s 
intention or state of mind in using the term. If the term encodes emphatic contrast, as I am 
arguing, it is only a small step from there to inferring an angry or negative state of mind on the 
part of the speaker. However, as I have shown above with respect to (9), this negative emotional 
message is not present in every use of the term. It is cancelable, and so it is non-conventional. 
The emotive content can thus be excluded from the lexical semantic content of ata, resulting in a 
simpler, more minimal semantics for the word.  
 In the next section, I provide a brief comparison of ata with the Spanish adversative 
discourse marker si, as described in Schwenter (1998, 2002), which is seen to be very similar to 
ata in its syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. 
  
3 Dialogal Discourse Markers: Kriol Ata and Spanish Si15 
 
According to Schwenter (1999, 2002) si is an adversative discourse marker, which is generally 
limited to colloquial conversation.16 It makes no truth-conditional contribution to its host 
proposition and must be used in a refutation of some aspect of preceding discourse, whether that 
aspect is propositional, presuppositional, inferential, metalinguistic, etc. In terms of syntactic 
position, si is required to be sentence initial. Further, si must appear in a dialogue rather than a 
monologue: i.e. it must be used to respond to a second speaker. Finally, Schwenter describes the 
refutation in question as exclusive, which means that the si-marked content is incompatible with 
that which it refutes.  
                                                            
14 For example, Comrie (1976: 111) defines markedness much more generally: 
 
The intuition behind the notion of markedness in linguistics is that, where we have an opposition between 
two or more members [...], it is often the case that one member is felt to be more usual, more normal, less 
specific than the other (in markedness terminology it is unmarked, the others marked).  
 
15 Schwenter (1999) derives this form and meaning of si from the Spanish conditional protasis marker si ‘if’. 
According to Schwenter, these different meanings (and others) should be understood as polysemous dimensions of 
the same form, positioned on a scale of relative distance from the conditional marker. See Schwenter (1999: 
Chapters 4-5). 
16 Schwenter (1999: 126) uses the term “adversative” as opposed to “contrastive”, as he argues that the former is a 
general cognitive concept, while “adversativity is a purely linguistic notion”. This point is well taken, and I believe 
ata could just as easily be described in terms of adversativity rather than contrast; however, the account of ata given 
here is generally situated in a tradition which uses terms such as “contrast” and “contrastive discourse marker”, so I 
retain those terms for consistency. 
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Kriol ata appears to line up almost directly with Spanish si. The obvious difference thus 
far is that ata requires its contrast be made emphatically, and this does not seem to be the case 
with a si-refutation, which certainly can be emphatic but which needn’t be. Further, I’m not 
certain it’s the case that ata content must be completely incompatible with the contrasted 
discourse content. My hesitation hinges on the ata example given above in (1), in which the ata 
content and contrasted discourse content might not be completely exclusive. I will discuss this 
example and its implications in terms of exclusivity in more detail below. Before doing so, 
however, let’s consider some of the sidata and how it compares to ata more generally.  
Consider (24) [Schwenter (1999: 4.15)], in which si is used in a propositional refutation, 
with respect to who hung up the phone on whom: 
 
(24) [M recounting a telephone incident between Q and Q’s boyfriend T] 
 M: y resulta que se cabreó y le colgó! 
  ‘and it turns out that she (Q) got mad and she hung up on him!’ 
 G: Si le colgó él a ella. 
  ‘SI he hung up on her.’ 
 M: Ah, le colgó él a ella? Pues ahora me entero. 
  ‘Ah, he hung up on her? Well now I find out.’ 
 
In (24), si contributes no truth conditional content to M’s statement. As Schwenter demonstrates, 
si is optional in the refutational, declarative uses such as (24). Further, the content of G’s 
refutation is incompatible with that of M’s: either she hung up on him, or he hung up on her. 
Notice, though, that the si-statement need not be understood as being an emphatic rejoinder to 
M’s claim above. 
Now consider a second example with si, in which it signals a refutation with a 
conversational implicature in the preceding discourse. In (25), speaker A implicates that B likes 
only a particular flavor of Kool-Aid. Q then refutes this implicature with a si-statement. 
 
(25) [B (age 6) looks strangely at a glass of purple Kool-Aid] 
 B: ¿Qué es eso? 
  ‘What is that?’ 
 A: Es el que te gusta a ti. 
  ‘It’s the one that you like.’ 
 Q: Si a ella le gustan todos los sabores. 
  ‘SI she likes all of the flavors.’ 
 
Again, the presence of si does not make a truth conditional contribution to its host proposition. 
The si-content is also incompatible with the implicature A conveys, which is that purple is the 
only flavor B likes. Thus, Q’s si-statement is a refutation of A’s conversational implicature, 
which it marks as incompatible with the si-content. 
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 As I mentioned above, it is not clear that ata must make a clear exclusive refutation, 
where the ata-content is completely incompatible with the contrasted discourse content. Consider 
(1) again. The ata-statement seems to contrast with a conversational implicature generated by 
A’s question: B takes A to imply that she was wrong to hit her sister. 
 
(1) A: Wai yu nak yu sista? 
 B: Ata da shee nak me fos! 
 
 A: Why did you hit your sister? 
 B: (But) it was she who hit me first! 
 
My hesitation here, and it is a mild one, is that it might be too strong to say that B’s ata-
statement is clearly incompatible with A’s implicature. That is, B could actually believe it was 
wrong to hit her sister, as A implies, but at the same time offer the ata-statement as an 
explanation for her action. This is tricky for a couple of reasons. For instance, we can’t really 
know the actual content of A’s conversational implicature. B might have inferred a message that 
is completely incompatible with her ata-statement, and in this case, ata would line up exactly 
with Schwenter’s depiction of si and exclusive refutation. On the other hand, B might have 
inferred a message from A that is logically compatible with B’s ata statement, but with which B 
still desires to make an emphatic contrast. In this latter case, ata would differ from Schwenter’s 
account of si. I don’t have an answer for this possible difference between the two at the present; 
however, future research will certainly be undertaken to clarify this.  
 We have seen, then, that ata and si are quite close along many dimensions: much closer 
in fact than either of them is to any English counterpart. They do appear to differ in terms of 
emphaticness and possibly in terms of strength of refutation as well.  
In the final section, I will suggest a possible origin for ata in the Kriol focus marker da. 
 
4 Da: A Possible Source for Ata 
 
The origin of ata is an interesting question. Many words in Belizean Kriol are transparently 
derived from English words and so their origins are straightforward. With ata, however, a 
source—English or otherwise—is not easy to locate. In this final section, I suggest very briefly a 
likely source for ata in the Kriol focus marker da.  
   
 Doing diachronic work on any creole is necessarily challenging, as they are almost 
always stigmatized languages with no writing system or written tradition. There are glimmerings 
of change here, though, with the development of alphabets in some creole languages, and some 
artists beginning to write poetry in fiction in creole. Most of this, however, is far too recent to 
provide the kind of record necessary to do diachronic work. As a result, what follows here is 
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mostly speculative, based on an existing form in the language that has a broader function but 
which has a similar phonology. 
 
 The morpheme da is a general focusing element in Kriol, which can occur at the sentence 
level or internally, highlighting a predicate, embedded sentence, or other constituent. According 
to Escure (1993), focus marker da has likely been derived from demonstrative dat ‘that’. She 
writes further of the focusing da that it is “in effect a functional equivalent of the English clefted 
construction” (235). And indeed, sentence-initial da is frequently rendered in it-cleft form when 
translated. Here are some samples from Decker (2005: p.98-99): 
 
(26) Da Jan weh gwain da Jamayka. 
 ‘It is John who is going to Jamaica.’ 
 
(27) Da Jan weh shub di kyaat. 
 ‘It was John who pushed the cart’. 
 
(28) Da wahn buk weh Jan gi mi. 
 ‘It was a book that John gave to me.’ 
 
It-clefts have been known to have focusing and contrastive properties since at least Jespersen 
(1949: 147f.), who describes clefts as:  
 
A cleaving of a sentence by means of it is (often followed by a relative pronoun or 
connective) serves to single out one particular element of the sentence and very often, by 
directing attention to it and bringing it, as it were, into focus, to 
mark a contrast. 
 
Since Jespersen’s work, cleft sentences have been discussed at great lengths in the linguistics 
literature in terms of their semantic and pragmatic properties.17 The properties of focus and 
contrast are mostly a general consensus, though how these shake out in terms of constructional or 
compositional semantics and pragmatics is less agreed upon. 
 In any case, it seems not a far leap from focus marker da, which creates cleft sentences, 
to the full contrastive marker ata. It seems likely that a sense of da could have undergone 
semantic narrowing, resulting in the discourse marker ata, which marks an emphatic contrast as 
opposed to the more broad focus of da. If this was the case, then it would be unsurprising that the 
phonological form of da would have shifted as well with the change in meaning. 
 
                                                            
17 I will not rehearse the cleft literature here. Readers are referred to Prince (1978), Hedberg (1990), Lambrecht 
(1994, 2001), Patten (2012), and the many references found in these works for detailed discussion of the syntax, 
semantics, pragmatics, and diachronic development of it-clefts. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
This paper has provided a brief look at the discourse marker ata in Belizean Kriol. I have argued 
that ata is used to convey an emphatic contrast with the immediately preceding discourse and 
that this contrast is a conventional implicature of the type described in Grice (1975). It also 
frequently is used to convey negative emotion, which I argue is not semantically encoded in the 
word but that should instead be calculated in context via Gricean pragmatic reasoning as a 
conversational implicature. Finally, I sketched a brief diachronic origin for ata in the Kriol focus 
marker da. This last part of the paper awaits a more comprehensive treatment in later work. 
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